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The Poor Law, Migration, and 
Economic Growth 
GEORGE R. BOYER 
The loss to the English economy caused by decreased migration resulting from 
relief payments to agricultural laborers is estimated. I conclude that, at worst, the 
Poor Law had a small negative impact on national product. If poor relief and 
wages were substitutes, the Poor Law may have had a positive impact on capital 
formation and economic growth. 
HISTORIANS have debated the microeconomic impact of the English Poor Law for nearly two centuries. It is now generally 
agreed that the granting of outdoor relief to able-bodied laborers did not 
have the disastrous consequences for the rural parish economy that 
contemporary observers and many historians had claimed. However, 
revisionist historians have yet to confront a second criticism of the Old 
Poor Law: that at the macro level outdoor relief caused a reduction in 
the rate of economic growth by slowing the rate of migration from the 
agricultural South to London and the industrial Northwest.1 Because 
the marginal product of labor was significantly higher in industrial cities 
than in agricultural areas, the Poor Law might have caused the early 
nineteenth-century British economy to forego a large free lunch by 
fostering an inefficient allocation of labor. 
One explanation for the large rural-urban wage gaps that existed 
during the first half of the nineteenth century was that the payment of 
outdoor relief to agricultural laborers hindered migration. According to 
Arthur Redford, "the mistaken and lax administration of poor relief in 
the southern counties" prior to 1834 was a major cause of "the 
immobility of the southern agricultural laborer."2 Karl Polanyi agreed 
that the Poor Law slowed rural-urban migration, but his story differed 
from that of Redford. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
Polanyi argued, "agriculture could not compete with town wages. . . . 
Methods had to be found which would . . . prevent the draining off of 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVI, No. 2 (June 1986). © The Economic History 
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507. 
The author is Assistant Professor, Department of Labor Economics, New York State School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14851-0952. 
1 would like to thank Claudia Goldin, Peter Lindert, Mary MacKinnon, Joel Mokyr, and Jeffrey 
Williamson for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
*The idea that the Poor Law "may have had some overall positive effects on the Industrial 
Revolution" was recently suggested by Joel Mokyr, "The Industrial Revolution and the New 
Economic History," in Joel Mokyr, ed., The Economics of the Industrial Revolution (New York, 
1985), pp. 14-15. The results of this paper support some of Mokyr's hypotheses. 
2
 Arthur Redford, Labour Migration in England, 1800-1850 (1st ed., 1926; 2nd ed., New York, 
1968), pp. 93-94. 
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rural labor, and raise agricultural wages without overburdening the 
farmer. Such a device was the Speenhamland Law."3 Both Redford and 
Polanyi maintained that relief expenditures raised laborers' annual 
incomes above the marginal product of labor. Unlike Redford, however, 
Polanyi did not dismiss the system of outdoor relief as mistaken. Rather, 
he argued that farmers used outdoor relief to raise their workers' 
incomes above the marginal product of labor, without increasing their 
own contributions to the "wages fund." 
Neither Redford nor Polanyi offers any evidence that the use of 
outdoor relief by rural parishes significantly slowed migration to indus-
trial areas. However, an estimate of the Poor Law's impact on labor 
mobility can be obtained by determining the extent to which relief 
payments raised agricultural laborers' incomes above the marginal 
product of labor and comparing this increase with rural-urban wage 
gaps. Because the results obtained from this procedure depend critically 
on the assumptions, three models of the economic role of poor relief are 
presented. 
The first model assumes that farmers paid their workers a wage rate 
equal to the marginal product of labor, so that any relief payments to 
able-bodied laborers were in excess of their marginal product. Such a 
policy was clearly inefficient from the point of view of labor-hiring 
farmers because a farmer's total payment to each worker would exceed 
the worker's marginal product by an amount Afl, where B is equal to the 
worker's relief benefits, and A equals the farmer's share of the poor rate. 
While it is difficult to believe that parishes dominated by labor-hiring 
farmers would adopt such a relief policy, Redford and others have 
argued that relief was administered in this manner from 1795 to 1834. 
The effect of poor relief on laborers' income can be estimated by 
calculating the ratio of annual relief benefits per agricultural laborer to 
annual wage income. Because it is not possible to determine what 
proportion of a parish's expenditures on poor relief went to agricultural 
laborers and their families, I calculated the benefit-to-wage income ratio 
in three ways, assuming that payments to agricultural laborers' families 
constituted 33 percent, 50 percent, and 67 percent of total relief 
expenditures.4 The results of these calculations are given for several 
3
 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York, 1944), p. 94. 
4
 Despite the extensive literature on the Old Poor Law, very little is known about the 
composition of the "pauper host." The Poor Law acted as "a welfare state in miniature," relieving 
not only able-bodied laborers but also aged and infirm persons, widows, and orphans. Unfortu-
nately, available data do not enable us to distinguish among types of recipients. Instead of trying 
to estimate the proportion of relief expenditures going to agricultural laborers' families, I chose 
three plausible values for it (33 percent, 50 percent and 67 percent), and provide three estimates of 
each result in Tables 1 to 4. For the counties included in the analysis, the proportion of families 
chiefly employed in agriculture as of 1831 varied from 0.33 to 0.57. These data, along with the fact 
that able-bodied laborers were not the sole recipients of relief, suggest that the actual proportion 
of relief expenditures going to agricultural laborers and their families was somewhere between 0.33 
and 0.5. 
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TABLE 1 
IMPACT OF POOR RELIEF ON AGRICULTURAL LABORERS' INCOME: MODEL 1 
County 
Expected Annual 
Wage Income 
Estimated Relief Expen-
ditures Per Agricultural 
Laborer 
(1) (2) (3) 
Percentage Increase in Labor-
ers' Income as a Result of 
Poor Relief 
(1) (2) (3) 
Bedford 
Berkshire 
Buckingham 
Cambridge 
Essex 
Hertford 
Huntingdon 
Kent 
Norfolk 
Northampton 
Oxford 
Southampton 
Suffolk 
Sussex 
Wiltshire 
£25.50 
27.30 
26.95 
26.18 
26.48 
28.39 
29.36 
32.26 
28.27 
24.96 
25.03 
26.95 
26.00 
28.73 
22.25 
£2.22 
2.73 
2.88 
2.21 
2.42 
2.18 
2.30 
3.36 
2.83 
2.89 
2.85 
3.12 
2.82 
3.63 
2.69 
£3.33 
4.09 
4.32 
3.31 
3.63 
3.27 
3.45 
5.04 
4.25 
4.32 
4.27 
4.67 
4.23 
5.45 
4.03 
£4.44 
5.46 
5.76 
4.42 
4.84 
4.36 
4.60 
6.72 
5.66 
5.78 
5.70 
6.24 
5.64 
7.26 
5.38 
8.7% 
10.0 
10.7 
8.4 
9.1 
7.7 
7.8 
10.4 
10.0 
11.6 
11.4 
11.6 
10.8 
12.6 
12.1 
13.1% 
15.0 
16.0 
12.6 
13.7 
11.5 
11.7 
15.6 
15.0 
17.4 
17.1 
17.3 
16.3 
19.0 
18.1 
17.4% 
20.0 
21.4 
16.9 
18.3 
15.4 
15.7 
20.8 
20.0 
23.2 
22.8 
23.2 
21.7 
25.3 
24.2 
Note: Columns 1 through 3 assume that 33 percent, 50 percent and 67 percent, respectively, of 
relief expenditures were paid to agricultural laborers and their families. 
Sources: Wage income data was obtained from George R. Boyer, "The Old Poor Law and the 
Agricultural Labor Market in Southern England: An Empirical Analysis," this JOURNAL, 46 (Mar. 
1986), p. 122. Data on relief expenditures were obtained from House of Commons, Accounts and 
Papers, vol. 47 (London, 1835). 
southeastern counties for the year 1831 in Table 1. The estimated effect 
of poor relief on the annual income of agricultural laborers varied 
significantly across counties. In Sussex, the county with the highest per 
capita relief expenditures in England in 1831, poor relief raised workers' 
annual income 12.6 to 25.3 percent above the marginal product of labor, 
while, at the other end of the scale, laborers in Hertford experienced a 
7.7 to 15.4 percent increase in income as a result of the Poor Law. 
To judge the impact of poor relief on rural-urban migration, the results 
in Table 1 must be compared with some measure of rural-urban wage 
differentials. Because those southern agricultural laborers who did 
migrate * 'moved overwhelmingly . . . towards London," I focus on 
wage gaps between London and the rural South. In 1831, builders' 
laborers in London earned between 21 and 22.5 shillings per week. 
Assuming a 44-week year, this implies an annual income of £47.5.5 The 
average expected wage income for agricultural laborers in 15 southeast-
ern counties (excluding the home counties of Middlesex and Surrey) 
5
 Data on the wage rates of London laborers were obtained from Arthur Bowley, Wages in the 
United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1900), p. 93. Henry Mayhew estimated 
that 30 percent of workers in the London building trade were unemployed during slack seasons. 
Cited in Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London (Oxford, 1971), p. 41. If the slack season was six 
months long, a laborer's expected number of weeks worked per year would be 26 + .7 (26), or 44.2. 
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was £27.1 in 1832. Adjusting for regional differences in the cost of living, 
the unskilled wage differential between London and the South for 1832 
is 60.2 percent.6 Similar wage gaps existed between the rural South and 
the industrial Northwest. Manchester builders' laborers earned 17 to 18 
shillings per week in 1839, which was 64 percent higher in real terms 
than the average weekly wage of southern agricultural laborers in 1837.7 
The calculated wage gap between London and each southeastern 
county is given in column 1 of Table 2. Columns 2 through 4 contain 
estimates of the proportion of the wage gap eliminated by the payment 
of poor relief to able-bodied laborers. 
What can be concluded about the impact of poor relief on labor 
mobility? If the proportion of relief expenditures paid to agricultural 
laborers was between 0.33 and 0.5, poor relief eliminated, on average, 
16 to 25 percent of the rural-urban wage gap. While these results offer 
some support for Redford's hypothesis that the payment of poor relief 
to agricultural laborers hindered migration, large wage gaps remain after 
accounting for relief expenditures, suggesting that migration to London 
continued to be an attractive option for rural workers. 
The results in Tables 1 and 2 can be used to estimate the loss in 
national product which the Poor Law caused by slowing rural-urban 
migration. I begin by estimating the potential gain to national product 
from eliminating the misallocation of labor between London and the 
southeastern agricultural counties. Suppose the demand for labor in 
agriculture and urban unskilled occupations (manufacturing) can be 
written as: 
La = eaaW/a 
and 
L^m C rf m 
where L is the demand for labor, W is the wage rate, e is the exponential 
function, and a and m refer to agriculture and urban unskilled occupa-
tions. For simplicity, I assume that labor supply equals labor demand at 
the existing wage in each sector. Given data on La, Lm, Wa, and Wm, and 
estimates of pa and /3m (the own-wage elasticities of demand for labor in 
agriculture and manufacturing), the equations can be solved for e"* and 
e
am
. The equilibrium wage rate in the absence of labor misallocation is 
then obtained by adding the equations together and solving for W*. 
Substituting W* into the original labor demand equations, one can 
6
 Cost of living data was obtained from N.F.R. Crafts, "Regional Price Variations in England in 
1843: An Aspect of the Standard-of-Living Debate," Explorations in Economic History, 19 (Jan. 
1982), p. 62. 
7
 Wage data for Manchester builders' laborers was obtained from Arthur Bowley, "The Statistics 
of Wages in the United Kingdom during the Last Hundred Years—Wages in the Building Trades," 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 63 (1900), p. 310. Data on agricultural laborers' wages was 
obtained from Bowley, Wages in the United Kingdom, table at end of book. 
TABLE 2 
IMPACT OF POOR RELIEF ON RURAL-URBAN WAGE GAPS 
County 
Bedford 
Berkshire 
Buckingham 
Cambridge 
Essex 
Hertford 
Huntingdon 
Kent 
Norfolk 
Northampton 
Oxford 
Southampton 
Suffolk 
Sussex 
Wiltshire 
Real Wage Gap 
Vis-a-Vis London 
73.6% 
62.2 
64.3 
64.1 
62.3 
55.9 
46.4 
32.8 
52.0 
66.8 
76.9 
59.0 
65.3 
49.1 
97.7 
Percentage of Wage Gap Eliminated by 
(1) 
11.8% 
16.1 
16.6 
13.1 
14.6 
13.8 
16.8 
31.7 
18.1 
17.4 
14.8 
19.7 
16.5 
25.7 
12.4 
Poor Relief 
(2) 
17.8% 
24.1 
24.9 
19.7 
22.0 
20.6 
25.2 
47.6 
26.9 
26.0 
22.2 
29.3 
25.0 
38.7 
18.5 
(3) 
23.6% 
32.2 
33.3 
26.4 
29.4 
27.5 
33.8 
63.4 
38.5 
34.7 
29.6 
39.3 
33.2 
51.5 
24.8 
Real Wage Gap 
(assuming a 20% 
disamenities premium) 
38.9% 
29.7 
31.4 
31.4 
29.9 
24.7 
17.1 
6.3 
21.6 
33.6 
41.5 
27.2 
32.5 
19.3 
58.0 
Percentage of Wage Gap Eliminated by 
(1) 
22.4% 
33.7 
34.1 
26.8 
30.4 
31.2 
45.6 
165.1 
46.3 
34.5 
27.5 
42.6 
33.4 
65.3 
20.9 
Poor Relief 
(2) 
33.7% 
50.5 
51.0 
40.1 
45.8 
46.6 
68.4 
247.6 
69.4 
51.8 
41.2 
63.6 
50.5 
98.4 
31.2 
(3) 
44.7% 
67.3 
68.2 
53.8 
61.2 
62.3 
91.8 
330.2 
92.6 
69.0 
54.9 
85.3 
66.8 
131.1 
41.7 
o 
o 
S 
05 
2 
o 
3 
Note: Columns 1 through 3 assume that 33 percent, 50 percent and 67 percent, respectively, of relief expenditures were paid to agricultural laborers and their 
families. 
Sources'. See text and Table 1. 
00 
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determine the optimal distribution of labor between the two sectors, Lfl* 
and Lm*. It is then a simple process to determine the dead-weight social 
loss caused by the misallocation of labor between London and the 
fifteen southeastern counties. Assuming that fia = -0.5 and j8m = -1.5, 
the dead-weight loss was equal to £430,000 in 1831, or 0.13 percent of 
national product.8 While this is a small percentage, it represents 5.1 
percent of the annual rate of growth of commodity output for 1821 to 
1831.9 
How much of the dead-weight loss resulted from the payment of poor 
relief to agricultural laborers? If poor relief eliminated 16 to 25 percent 
of the rural-urban wage gap, one could argue that no more than 25 
percent of the dead-weight loss can be attributed to the Poor Law. In 
other words, the decline in migration caused by poor relief reduced 
national income by at most £107,500 in 1831. 
For those who consider the above estimate to be too small, a second 
method for determining the dead-weight loss is offered. Given estimates 
of the elasticity of migration with respect to rural income and data on the 
actual number of migrants out of the southern agricultural counties, the 
number of migrants in the absence of poor relief can be estimated. 
Census data for 1851 and 1861 suggest that the income elasticity of 
migration was between -0.292 and -0.498.10 Combining these esti-
mates with the results in Table 1 indicates that the rate of out-migration 
from the rural South declined by 3.2 to 10.5 percent as a result of the 
Poor Law. 
Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole estimate that 515,000 persons migrated 
out of the southern counties between 1801 and 1831, mostly to Lon-
don.11 To get an upper bound estimate of the impact of poor relief, 
suppose that 600,000 persons migrated during the period, or 20,000 a 
year. It follows that the payment of poor relief to rural laborers caused 
an annual reduction in migration of 661 to 2,346 persons from the rural 
South. Given an average real wage gap of £16.3 in 1831, the annual 
dead-weight loss attributable to poor relief was between £10,774 and 
£38,240. Even if the income elasticity of migration is assumed to be as 
8
 Data on national product were obtained from Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic 
Growth 1688-1959 (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1967), p. 166. The loss in national product was also 
estimated for other values of ft and ft,. Assuming that ft = -0 .5 and ft, = -1 .0 , the estimated 
dead-weight loss was equal to £377,000. For ft = -1 .0 and ft = -1 .0 , the estimated dead-weight 
loss equaled £546,000. Obviously, the choice of own-wage elasticities does not have a large impact 
on the estimated loss in national product. 
9
 Commodity output grew at an annual rate of 2.50 percent from 1821 to 1831. N.F.R. Crafts, 
British Economic Growth During the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1985), p. 47. 
10
 The estimates of the income elasticity of migration were obtained from Richard Vedder and 
David Cooper, "Nineteenth Century English and Welsh Geographic Labor Mobility: Some Further 
Evidence," Annals of Regional Science, 8 (June 1974), p. 134; and Michael Greenwood and Lloyd 
Thomas, "Geographic Labor Mobility in Nineteenth Century England and Wales," Annals of 
Regional Science, 1 (Dec. 1973), p. 102. 
11
 Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth, p. 118. 
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large as -1.24 (the largest estimate cited in a survey article on migration 
in developing counties), the best guess estimate of the annual dead-
weight loss is only £80,700, or 0.02 percent of national product.12 
Up to this point I have ignored the issue of urban disamenities. If part 
of the urban wage represented a "disamenities premium," then the true 
rural-urban wage gap was smaller than 60.2 percent, and the percentage 
of the wage gap eliminated by poor relief was correspondingly larger. 
Suppose that 20 percent of the wage paid to unskilled London laborers 
was in fact a compensating wage differential necessary to induce 
workers to live in London.13 Column 5 of Table 2 contains estimates of 
the real wage gap between London and each southeastern county in 
1831, and columns 6 to 8 contain estimates of the proportion of the wage 
gap eliminated by poor relief. If 33 to 50 percent of relief payments went 
to agricultural laborers, then the Poor Law eliminated from one-third to 
two-thirds of the wage gap, which must have significantly slowed 
migration to London. However, with a 20 percent disamenities pre-
mium, the dead-weight loss caused by the misallocation of labor in the 
Southeast was equal to only £105,500 in 1831, so that even if the Poor 
Law was the sole cause of labor's misallocation, its impact on national 
product was small. 
The above results all lead to the same conclusion. Even if all relief 
payments to agricultural laborers were in excess of their marginal 
product, there is no evidence that the Poor Law kept the English 
economy from enjoying a large free lunch associated with transferring 
workers from low productivity agricultural jobs to high productivity 
urban employment. Moreover, there are two reasons to believe that the 
above results significantly overestimate the impact of poor relief on 
migration and national product. First, I have assumed, for simplicity, 
that relief expenditures were distributed evenly among agricultural 
laborers. However, married men with large families received much 
larger relief payments than single males, and single young adults 
dominated the flow of migrants to English cities.14 The most mobile 
group of rural laborers was therefore that least affected by poor relief. 
Second, the assumption that all relief payments were in excess of 
12
 The income elasticity of migration estimate was obtained from Michael Todaro, "Internal 
Migration in Developing Countries: A Survey," in Richard Easterlin, ed., Population and 
Economic Change in Developing Countries (Chicago, 1980), p. 380. The best-guess estimate 
assumes that 50 percent of relief expenditures went to agricultural laborers. 
13
 Williamson found the urban disamenities premium to be between 7 and 13 percent in the North 
of England during the 1830s and 1840s. The estimated disamenities premium for intraregional 
migration in the South was negative. Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Was the Industrial Revolution Worth 
It? Disamenities and Death in 19th Century British Towns," Explorations in Economic History, 19 
(July 1982), p. 232. 
14
 Jeffrey G. Williamson, "City Immigration, Selectivity Bias and Human Capital Transfers 
during the British Industrial Revolution," Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion 
Paper No. 1171 (July 1985), pp. 8-14. 
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laborers' marginal product is almost certainly incorrect. In contrast, the 
second model assumes that labor-hiring farmers dominated local parish 
politics and administered relief in such a way as to maximize profits. 
Profit-maximizing farmers would have used poor relief as a substitute 
for wage payments, since part of the poor rate was paid by taxpayers 
who did not hire labor.15 Thus, it cannot be assumed that farmers 
offered workers a wage rate equal to the marginal product of labor. 
Suppose instead that the total compensation package paid by farmers to 
their employees (consisting of wages and farmers' contribution to relief 
benefits) was equal to labor's marginal product: 
W + XB = MP
€ 
In other words, the system of outdoor relief enabled farmers to reduce 
their wage payments by an amount AS, equal to their contribution to the 
poor rate. Farmers' total expenditure on labor was not affected by the 
Poor Law, and the difference between laborers' income and their 
marginal product was determined solely by the contribution of non-
labor-hiring taxpayers to the poor rate. A laborer's annual income is 
thus: 
W + B = MPi + (1 - X)B 
where (1 - X)B is the share of relief benefits paid by non-labor-hiring 
taxpayers. The percentage increase in workers' income above their 
marginal product brought about by the Poor Law is given by: 
(1 - X)B/MP£ = (1 - X)B/(W + XB) 
Notice that this is precisely the solution to the problem of rising urban 
wage rates suggested by Polanyi; farmers used the Poor Law to raise 
their laborers' annual incomes without increasing their own payments to 
labor. 
To determine the impact of such a policy on rural-urban migration, 
the value of (1 - A), the proportion of poor relief expenditures paid by 
local taxpayers other than labor-hiring farmers, must be determined. 
The contribution of non-labor-hiring taxpayers can be estimated using 
data on the proportion of poor-rate assessments levied on properties 
valued at less than £20. Available data from rural Suffolk and 
Southampton suggest that approximately 15 percent of the poor rate 
came from such assessments.16 Since most assessments of more than 
15
 George R. Boyer, "An Economic Model of the English Poor Law circa 1780-1834," 
Explorations in Economic History, 22 (Apr. 1985), pp. 157-58. For evidence that labor-hiring 
farmers followed such policies, see Anne Digby, Pauper Palaces (London, 1978), pp. 105-106; and 
George R. Boyer, "The Old Poor Law and the Agricultural Labor Market in Southern England: An 
Empirical Approach," this JOURNAL, 46 (March 1986), p. 130. 
16
 Data on the distribution of poor rate assessments in Suffolk and Southampton was obtained 
from "Returns Relating to Rating of Tenements in Lancashire, Suffolk, Hampshire, and 
Gloucestershire," House of Commons, Accounts and Papers, 47 (London, 1849), pp. 618-19. 
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TABLE 3 
IMPACT OF POOR RELIEF ON AGRICULTURAL LABORERS' INCOME: MODEL 2 
Estimated Increase in Laborers' 
Income as a Result of Poor Relief Real Wage Gap Percentage of Wage Gap 
County 
Bedford 
Berkshire 
Buckingham 
Cambridge 
Essex 
Hertford 
Huntingdon 
Kent 
Norfolk 
Northampton 
Oxford 
Southampton 
Suffolk 
Sussex 
Wiltshire 
(1) 
1.6% 
1.9 
2.0 
1.6 
1.7 
1.5 
1.5 
1.9 
1.7 
2.1 
2.1 
2.1 
2.0 
2.3 
2.2 
(2) 
2.4% 
2.7 
2.8 
2.3 
2.5 
2.1 
2.1 
2.8 
2.5 
3.1 
3.0 
3.0 
2.9 
3.3 
3.2 
(3) 
3.1% 
3.4 
3.6 
3.0 
3.2 
2.7 
2.8 
3.6 
3.4 
3.9 
3.9 
3.9 
3.7 
4.2 
4.1 
Vis-a-Vis Londona 
57.2% 
44.8 
45.6 
49.1 
46.3 
42.8 
33.8 
18.1 
28.9 
46.5 
55.6 
39.6 
46.3 
29.5 
72.8 
Eliminated by Po 
4.2% 
6.0 
6.1 
4.7 
5.4 
4.9 
6.2 
15.5 
8.7 
6.7 
5.4 
7.6 
6.3 
11.2 
4.4 
a
 The calculations in these columns are based on the assumption that 50 percent of relief 
expenditures were paid to agricultural laborers. 
Note: Columns 1 through 3 assume that 33 percent, 50 percent and 67 percent, respectively, of 
relief expenditures were paid to agricultural laborers and their families. 
Sources: See text and Table 1. 
£20 were levied on labor-hiring farmers, I assume that non-labor-hiring 
taxpayers paid 20 percent of the poor rate in grain-producing areas.17 
Table 3 contains estimates of the percentage increase in agricultural 
laborers' annual incomes caused by the Poor Law, and the percentage 
of the rural-urban wage gap eliminated by relief payments, for the same 
counties as before. The conclusion to be reached from the results is 
clear. Farmers may have attempted to use the Poor Law as a dam to 
"prevent the draining off of rural labor," as Polanyi contended, but such 
a policy could not have been successful. Even in generous Sussex, poor 
relief raised laborers' incomes only 2.3 to 4.2 percent above their 
marginal product. The impact of the Poor Law on national income was 
correspondingly small. If the income elasticity of migration was equal to 
-1.24, the largest of the estimates, the annual dead-weight loss attrib-
utable to poor relief was between £6,600 and £12,200. The cumulative 
17
 A complete assessment for Terling, Essex, in 1801 showed that 11.3 percent of the poor rate 
came from assessments of less than £20, and 32.8 percent came from assessments of less than £50 
(Essex Record Office, D/P 299/12/4). To obtain an upper bound estimate of the proportion of the 
poor rate paid by non-labor-hiring taxpayers, suppose that £50 of assessed value marked the cutoff 
between labor-hiring and non-labor-hiring taxpayers. The Terling data then suggest that about 
one-third of the poor rate was paid by non-labor-hiring taxpayers. However, increasing the value 
of (1 - A) from 0.2 to 0.33 does not have a significant impact on the conclusion regarding the effect 
of poor relief on migration. 
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loss to the economy from 1795 to 1834 (the generally accepted bound-
aries for the predominance of outdoor relief) was at most £500,000, or 
0.15 percent of national product in 1831. 
In sum, if labor-hiring farmers considered wages and poor relief to be 
substitutes, and available evidence suggests that they did, then the Poor 
Law had a trivial negative impact on labor mobility and national 
product. Indeed, a plausible case exists in which politically dominant 
farmers administered relief in such a way as to cause national product to 
increase. Suppose migration costs and the urban disamenities premium 
were large enough to account for the entire rural-urban wage gap, so 
that the regional labor market was in equilibrium between, say, 1820 and 
1834. (This is a special case of the third model, which assumes that, 
despite the existing rural-urban wage differentials, agricultural laborers 
did not migrate to urban areas if they received an income of some 
reservation level, assumed equal to the marginal product of labor.)18 In 
this case, politically dominant farmers could have used the system of 
poor relief to reduce their annual payments to workers below the 
marginal product of labor. Such a policy would have been especially 
effective in grain-producing areas, where the demand for labor was 
highly seasonal.19 Farmers who had previously offered workers a 
year-long labor contract at a wage rate equal to the marginal product of 
labor could now lay off workers during slack seasons, so long as 
laborers' annual income from wages and poor relief was equal to their 
reservation income, R. This can be expressed as: 
R = W + B = W + \B + (1-\)B 
Under this system, farmers' labor costs are equal to: 
W + AB = R - (1 - \)B 
Thus, farmers' payments to labor are reduced by an amount (1 - \)B 
per worker, the contribution of non-labor-hiring taxpayers to the relief 
fund. 
The system of poor relief should have no effect on migration in this 
model; it replaces laborers' wage income one for one. On the other 
hand, the transfer of income from taxpayers who did not hire labor to 
labor-hiring farmers should have a positive impact on economic growth. 
Non-labor-hiring taxpayers consisted mainly of artisans, shopkeepers, 
and family farmers, whose incomes were significantly below those of 
labor-hiring farmers. Ironically, the Poor Law transferred income from 
low to high income individuals and therefore might have increased 
savings. The reduction in farmers' labor costs should have increased the 
18
 Of course, this model would also apply if workers' reservation income was less than the 
marginal product of labor. 
19
 For a further discussion of this model, see Boyer, "An Economic Model of the English Poor 
Law," pp. 154-61. 
Poor Law and Migration 429 
TABLE 4 
INCOME TRANSFER TO LABOR-HIRING FARMERS OR LANDLORDS: MODEL 3 
County 
Bedford 
Berkshire 
Buckingham 
Cambridge 
Essex 
Hertford 
Huntingdon 
Kent 
Norfolk 
Northampton 
Oxford 
Southampton 
Suffolk 
Sussex 
Wiltshire 
Total 
Estimated Income Transfer 
Per Abie-Bodied Laborer 
(1) 
£0.44 
0.55 
0.58 
0.44 
0.48 
0.44 
0.46 
0.67 
0.57 
0.58 
0.57 
0.62 
0.56 
0.73 
0.54 
(2) 
£0.67 
0.82 
0.86 
0.66 
0.73 
0.65 
0.69 
1.01 
0.85 
0.87 
0.85 
0.93 
0.85 
1.09 
0.81 
(3) 
£0.89 
1.09 
1.15 
0.88 
0.97 
0.87 
0.92 
1.34 
1.13 
1.16 
1.14 
1.25 
1.13 
1.45 
1.08 
Estimated Total Income Transfer to 
Labor-Hiring Farmers or 
(1) 
£5,099 
8,141 
9,711 
6,907 
18,352 
6,468 
2,745 
24,196 
21,356 
10,310 
9,119 
15,299 
18,502 
19,071 
13,342 
188,618 
(2) 
£7,764 
12,138 
14,399 
10,361 
27,911 
9,555 
4,117 
36,474 
31,846 
15,464 
13,598 
22,948 
28,084 
28,476 
20,014 
283,149 
Landlords 
(3) 
£10,313 
16,134 
19,254 
13,814 
37,087 
12,789 
5,490 
48,391 
42,337 
20,619 
18,238 
30,844 
37,335 
37,881 
26,685 
377,208 
Note: Columns 1 through 3 assume that 33 percent, 50 percent and 67 percent, respectively, of 
relief expenditures were paid to agricultural laborers and their families. 
Sources: See text and Table 1. 
demand for land, causing rents to increase. Thus much, if not all, of the 
gain to farmers might have been passed on to (wealthier) landlords. The 
income transfer should have led to increased capital formation in 
agriculture or increased investment outside of agriculture. 
Three estimates of the size of the income transfer are given in Table 
4. To get an idea of the magnitude of the transfer, total fixed capital 
formation in agriculture for all of Great Britain was £3.4 million per 
annum during the years 1830 to 1835.20 Assuming that 30 to 40 percent 
of the capital formation took place in the counties listed in Table 4, the 
annual transfer of income to labor-hiring farmers or landlords repre-
sented between 13.9 and 37.0 percent of fixed capital formation in 
agriculture in the Southeast of England.21 Of course, the actual increase 
in investment would depend on the difference in savings rates among 
non-labor-hiring taxpayers, labor-hiring farmers, and landlords. Lack of 
information on savings behavior makes it impossible to accurately 
estimate the annual increase in investment brought about by the Poor 
Law, but I would guess that it was on the order of £75,000 to £150,000, 
20
 Charles Feinstein, "Capital Formation in Great Britain," in Peter Mathias and M. M. Postan, 
eds., Cambridge Economic History of Europe, (Cambridge, 1978), vol. 8, part 1, p. 75. 
21
 In 1831, the 15 southeastern counties included in Table 4 contained about 27 percent of the 
adult male agricultural laborers in Great Britain. My assumption that 40 percent of capital 
formation in agriculture took place in these counties is meant to yield a lower bound estimate for 
the ratio of the income subsidy received by farmers to the amount of fixed capital formation. 
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or 5.5 to 14.7 percent of fixed capital formation in agriculture. Thus, the 
Poor Law might have played a role in funding the agricultural improve-
ments of the first third of the nineteenth century. 
Each of the above models has pointed to the same conclusion: the 
administration of poor relief in the rural South did not significantly 
hinder labor mobility or economic growth during the early nineteenth 
century. But perhaps the models were poorly specified and did not offer 
an acceptable test of the hypothesis. Therefore I offer one last test of the 
effect of poor relief on rural-urban migration. If passage of the Poor Law 
Amendment Act stimulated migration to urban areas, a decline in 
rural-urban wage gaps after 1834 should be observed, other things 
equal. However, data on movements in real wage rates for London 
builders' laborers and southern agricultural laborers suggest that wage 
gaps actually increased until at least 1850. Real weekly wages for 
London laborers increased by 39.6 percent from 1831 to 1848, while 
weekly wage rates for agricultural laborers increased by only 9.2 
percent between 1832 and 1850.22 The southern regional labor market 
did not become more efficient as a result of the abolition of outdoor 
relief. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The above analysis has reached some surprising conclusions which 
suggest that the traditional interpretation of the English Poor Law's 
impact on economic growth needs to be revised. The hypothesis that the 
existence of poor relief for able-bodied agricultural laborers significantly 
slowed rural-urban migration (and hence economic growth) is not 
supported by the evidence. Rather than retard economic growth, the 
Poor Law at worst had little effect on the economy and at best 
stimulated growth by increasing the profit rates of labor-hiring farmers 
or the rental income of landlords. 
Unfortunately, lack of data has forced me to make several assump-
tions concerning the proportion of poor relief going to able-bodied 
laborers, and the proportion of the poor rate paid by non-labor-hiring 
taxpayers. Before a more precise estimate of the impact of poor relief on 
economic growth can be achieved, more must be learned about who 
received poor relief and who paid the poor rate. To overcome the lack 
of data, I provide what I think are reasonable upper and lower bound 
estimates for each result. While the results are approximations, I doubt 
that further research will change the general direction of the 
conclusions. 
22
 Wage data were obtained from Bowley, Wages in the United Kingdom, p. 83 and table at end 
of book. Cost of living data came from Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "English 
Workers' Living Standards During the Industrial Revolution: A New Look," Economic History 
Review, 2nd series, 36 (Jan. 1983), p. 11. 
